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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the ROG control costs of stationary sources in the San Joaquin Valley of
California. The cost-effectiveness of market incentive approaches such as an uniform marketable
permit system, localized marketable permit system and an ambient permit system as well as a
traditional command-and-control approach are examined.1 A receptor is a geographical area in which air quality is affected by the emission
sources. For example, a city can be considered as a receptor.
2 Receptor sites that violate air quality standards.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional emission command-and-control(CAC) approaches have been criticized as more
costly than marketable emission permit systems to meet a required emission reduction or to
achieve a desired air quality. In marketable permit systems, polluters with higher costs for
emission control buy permits from polluters with lower costs, and as a result, total aggregate
abatement costs can is reduced. 
The most-effective permit system to achieve a desired air quality would be ambient permit
system (APS) in which stationary sources can freely trade their emission permits based on their
differentiated contribution to the same receptors
1. This approach, however, is not always taken
into consideration because of its difficulty of obtaining spatial dispersion characteristics of
emissions from stationary sources to receptors.  Uniform marketable permit system (UMPS) is the
least-cost strategy to meet a required reduction in total emissions. This system allows one-to-one
permits trading under the assumption that all emission sources have the same impact on air quality
in a region. A shortcoming of this system is that hot spots
2 can be created after trading of
emission permits from less polluted area to more polluted area in a region. 
           Localized marketable permit system (LMPS) allows free trading of their emission permits
on a one-to-one basis as long as the sources located within same parts of a region, in which
emissions are considered to have the same effects on the receptors. Although, not as cost-
effective as APS due to limited possibility of permits trading, LMPS may result in significant cost4
savings from the traditional standards-based approaches and it also can considerably reduce the
possibility that hot spots are created.
Many studies (Atkinson and Lewis, 1974; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982; Seskin,
Anderson, and Reid, 1983; Hahn and Noll, 1983; Oates, Portney and McGartland, 1989;
Schmalensee and Joskow, 1998) have found that marketable permit systems are more cost-
effective than standard-based approaches in achieving the required emission reduction or the
given air quality objectives. 
  Atkinson and Lewis, 1974, developed control cost data for particulate emission controls
from 27 stationary sources in the St. Louis Air Quality Control Region (AQCR). They assumed
that sources would install additional emission control devices that were compatible with the
existing control measures to reduce further particulate emissions. The total additional cost of
further emission reductions is equal to the sum of the annualized capital and installation costs plus
the operating and maintenance costs of the additional control equipment. Finally, the constant
marginal cost data were constructed by dividing the total additional costs by  the total additional
emission reductions in tons. These control cost data were also used by Atkinson and Tietenberg,
1982. They found that the state CAC policies to control air quality were six to ten times more
costly than a cost-minimizing strategy. 
Hahn et al., 1982, estimated the cost savings of the emission permit system for sulfur
dioxide (SO2) in the Los Angeles area. Their study identified a cost savings of 3-19% of CAC
policy. Seskin, Anderson, and Reid, 1982, also used a mathematical model to examine the costs of
meeting a prospective short-term standard for nitrogen dioxide (NO2) under a range of alternative
emission control strategies for stationary sources in the Chicago Air Quality Control Region.5
Their analysis indicates that the more efficient emission control programs are much less costly
than current CAC policies. They estimated that the annual control costs for the ambient permit
system was $9 million, while CAC policy required $130 million to attain the same ambient
standard. 
Maloney and Yandle, 1984, examined Reactive Organic Gases (ROG) emission control
cost functions for 543 sources in 52 plants of the DuPont Company. They assumed stacking
technologies in which emission control devices were applied in sequence to reduce further
emissions. The marginal emission control costs would be the costs incurred through the
implementation of the additional control measures installed in sequence. By repeating these
stacking processes, a group of emission control cost data and emission control levels would be
constructed. Maloney and Yandle developed emission control cost functions for each source
based on these data points through the application of econometric analysis. They estimated
hydrocarbon pollution control costs under the alternative regulatory approaches of individual
source or process standards, plant standards, and regionally marketable permits. Their study
showed that the cost savings realized from a system which relied on marketable permits, when
compared to source standards, ranged from 85% at the 60% abatement goal to a 29.5% savings
for a 99% reduction of emissions.  
Oates, Portney and McGartland, 1989, examined costs of controlling total suspended
particulate (TSP) under two different policies: incentive based (IB) policy and CAC policy. They
estimated that the marginal control costs of reducing TSP concentration to 100 µg/m
3 TSP
standard in Baltimore would be $32.7 million under IB policy, while the standard would cost
$48.1 million under CAC policy. Schmalensee, et. al., 1998 estimated the total cost of reducing6
sulfur dioxide emissions by 3.9 million tons in 1995 was about 725 million, which was lower on
the order of $225-375 million per year to CAC policies.
The California state policy directed at reducing ROG emissions from stationary sources
has been largely on emission standards with limited use of emission permits.  The current permit
systems, however,  have many restrictions on emission permit trading. For example, new sources
are allowed to buy emission reduction credits only if they control their emissions to the LAER
(lowest achievable emission rate) standard (Kim, 1994). Existing sources with significantly higher
emission rates than the standards are now allowed to buy emission reduction credits without
reducing their emissions to LAER standard (Kim, 1994). Each sources with different impacts on a
regional air quality are often prevented from trading their spatially differentiated permits due to its
complexity involved. 
An alternative permit system which can provide cost-savings from the current system in
the San Joaquin Valley of California would be LMPS with full permits transferability.  All sources
can freely trade their permits on a one-to-one basis if they locate in the same local areas. It would
not significantly distort the effectiveness of APS because stationary sources are clustered into a
few cities within which their emissions can be considered to have the same impact on air quality in
the San Joaquin Valley. LMPS also can prevent hot spots from being created. Because of the
spatial distribution of the cities in which stationary sources are clustered in the San Joaquin Valley
which lies over about 400 miles long, one-to-one permits trading among sources across remote
cities can easily create hot spots.
Although marketable permit systems are well known to meet emission reductions or air














empirical comparison among different marketable permits designs at a regional  level in terms of
their cost-effectiveness and possibility of creating hot spots. This paper examined relative cost-
effectiveness and assurance of achieving desired air quality associated with the four different
traditional command-and-control (CAC) policy represented by uniform percentage reductions of
emissions across all stationary sources, localized marketable permit system (LMPS), uniform
marketable permit system (UMPS), and ambient permit system (APS) with a simple ROG
dispersion relationship based on distances between stationary sources and receptors.
2. THE ECONOMICS OF ROG EMISSION CONTROL.
The net benefit of ROG emission control would be maximized at the optimal control level.
The optimization problem can be defined as finding the set of xjs which maximize:
where,
Bij : benefits of i
th receptor due to emission controls from j
th source, i=1...n, receptors,                
j=1...m, emission sources.
Cj : total control costs of j
th source.
Xj
Optimal : optimal control level from j
th source.
Assuming that second-order conditions are well behaved, the first order conditions (FOCs) for
this optimization problem are :                  3 This formulation works only if there is a linear relationship between sources and
receptors. If there is non-linear relationship between them, the transfer coefficient (aij) is no longer























The social optimum will be achieved if marginal control costs of the j
th source equal the sum of n
receptors' marginal benefit due to emission controls on the j
th source. The resulting optimal level
of control for the j
th source is Xj
Optimal. In practice, this social optimum is very difficult to identify,
because estimating the benefit functions for all the receptors is difficult. 
Ambient Least-cost Strategy (APS)
Current policy approaches to controlling air emission focus on alternative policies for
achieving a given air quality goal. One such policy is to minimize the costs of achieving a certain
ambient air quality standard. The problem can be formulated as
3:  
where,
aij : the linear transfer coefficient that relates emission reductions from the j
th source to air              
 quality at the i
th receptor.
Ei : the emission reduction required to achieve the air quality standard at the i
th receptor.    
Xj
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This is equivalent to minimizing the following Lagrangian:
where,
µi : Lagrangian multipliers.
The FOCs for this problem are:
The equation above shows that the marginal control cost for the j
th source (Cj'(Xj
Ambient))
should be equal to the sum of the transfer coefficients weighted by Lagrangian multipliers (µi =
dC/dEi). Here, the Lagrangian multipliers reflect the changes in total control costs due to changes
in the ambient air quality control level at site i. The total control costs of meeting ambient air
quality constraints would be minimized if each source controls such that its marginal control cost
is equal to its contribution to the total control costs of meeting the ambient air quality control
levels. An ambient least-cost strategy will achieve the social optimum if:
That is, if the Ei are set optimally, and if the transfer coefficient approach is correct, then this
method will achieve the social optimum. If equation 6) does not hold, the ambient least-cost
strategy will not achieve the socially optimal level of control. However, it still minimizes control




















that transfer coefficients (aij) be identified, which is very difficult and costly. In many air quality
control regions, such as the San Joaquin Valley, transfer coefficients are unavailable. 
Emission Least-cost strategy (UMPS)
An emission least-cost strategy does not require information about the transfer
coefficients. It minimizes the total control costs of emission reductions, but it does not necessarily
meet the ambient standard at all receptors. This system can be represented as:
where, 
Xj
Emission : the emission reductions from j
th source. 
E : total emission reduction from all sources needed to achieve the ozone standard. 
This is equivalent to minimizing the following Lagrangian:
From the FOC, the solution satisfies:
   10) Cj'(Xj
Emission) = µ























k￿1 ￿ Er ,r￿1,...,8
It means that the marginal effect of one more unit of emissions is the same on all receptors,
regardless of where that unit is produced. If these conditions do not hold, as is the usual case,
then the emission strategy does not meet the ambient standard at all receptors and hot spot
problems occur. 
Neither APS nor UMPS may not be an appropriate emission control policy for the San
Joaquin Valley. The Valley has not yet identified the transfer coefficients necessary for APS.
UMPS can be implemented which minimizes the total control costs of emission reductions, but
some receptors could experience ozone concentrations that are higher than a required air quality
standard in the Valley. 
Local Emission Least-cost Strategy (LMPS)
Localized marketable permit system would be more appropriate to ensure that no
receptors violate a required air quality and yet will require lower compliance costs than CAC
approach. The stationary sources in each local area are considered to contribute equally to the air
quality in the Valley. LMPS can be represented as:
where,
Ck
r: total emission control cost for k
th source in r
th local area,  k = 1..m,  r = 1..8.12
Xk
r 
Local: the tons of ROG emission to be removed in r
th region by the k
th source under LMPS.
Mr: number of sources in area r.
Er: the total tons of ROG emission to be removed in area r.
The objective of this system is to minimize the total control costs to the stationary sources on the
condition that the total ROG emissions for each local area (r, r=1,..,8) is reduced to the level (Er)
that is necessary to attain a proposed air quality in that area. Unlike CAC, the stationary sources
in each area are allowed to trade freely their emission permits. Sources with higher control costs
buy emission permits from sources with lower control costs; thus, total control cost to the
stationary sources to reduce ROG emissions is smaller than it would be without such trading of
emission permits.
3. THE CASE STUDY: THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OF CALIFORNIA
The San Joaquin Valley of California consists of eight counties and is approximately 350
miles in length and 50 miles in width. About 3.5 million people live in this Valley with a climate of
hot summers and rainy winters. The Valley is a major agricultural production region and is also
the second worst air quality region in California. Air quality in most of the counties in the San
Joaquin Valley is much worse than the current ambient air quality standards. For each day, over
600 tons of ROG are emitted into the air in the Valley (CARB, 1993). Seventy percent of ROG
emissions is from stationary sources. The other thirty percent of ROG emissions comes from
mobile sources. The major stationary sources of ROG in the San Joaquin Valley are the petroleum
refining and distribution industry. Table 1 details the stationary sources and their ROG emission13
per day. 
 
                                                              Table 1
                               Stationary Emission Inventory in the San Joaquin Valley.
                                      (California Air Resource Board (CARB), 1993)
Major Source Category ROG Emissions (Tons/Day)
Fuel Combustion 14 (4.0%)
Waste Burning 23 (6.6%)
Solvent Use 87 (24.9%)
Petroleum Process, Storage, and Transfer 140 (40.0%)
Industrial Process 12 (3.4%)
Misc Processes 82 (23.4%)
Total 350 (100%)
In the San Joaquin Valley, the stationary sources are clustered into a few cities within
which emissions can be considered to have the same impact on the air quality.  Kern and Fresno
counties alone comprise 85% of ROG emissions stationary sources in the Valley. Table 2 details
the distribution of ROG emitting stationary sources among eight counties in the San Joaquin
Valley. Of the hundreds of plants in the Valley, 97 large plants with 250 sources account for more
than 95% of the total ROG emissions. The 97 ROG emitting plants are analyzed in this study to
illustrate the costs of controlling ROG emissions in the San Joaquin Valley.
The air quality in San Joaquin Valley is reasonably independent from pollution sources in
the San Francisco areas because wind blows from the San Francisco bay to Sacramento Valley14
and then to Nevada. It is also protected from pollution sources in the Los Angeles areas due to
the Tehachapi mountains that blocks emission from flying over to the San Joaquin Valley.
Therefore, local stationary and mobile sources are responsible for the air quality in the Valley.
 
                                                             Table 2
            Distribution of Stationary Sources in the San Joaquin Valley (CARB, 1992a)
County Number of ROG
Stationary Sources
Percentage Share of Total
ROG Emission in SJV
Major cities in which
stationary sources
locate
Kern 169 80% Bakersfield
Fresno  24  5% Fresno
San Joaquin  25  3% Stockton
Stanislaus  12  2% Modesto
Merced   6  2% Merced
Madera   3  5% Madera
Tulare   3  3% Tulare
Kings   8  0.3% Hanford
Control Cost Data
Two general approaches for controlling further emissions from stationary sources are
based on the smokestack emission control technologies. One approach requires the installation of
secondary control equipment, which is comparable to existing equipment. This approach could
reduce further emissions as long as secondary control equipment provides additional emission
reductions; however, it would be expensive to employ additional control equipment to reduce15
emissions further since a large part of the control cost is capital and installation cost. The other
approach achieves a reduction in ROG emissions by increasing the destruction efficiencies of
existing control equipment. The advantage of this approach is that it would be cheaper than the
former because it only increases operating costs. However, the benefit to be realized by this
approach is limited because most sources operate their control equipment near their maximum
efficiencies (CARB, 1991a).
Observing the methods used by other studies, this study assumes that pollution control
treatments can be applied in sequence when developing ROG emission control costs. For
example, an incinerator of any size could control inlet gases with a maximum efficiency of
approximately 90% (Vaart, Vatavuk, and Wehe, 1991). If we need to control additional
emissions, we can sequentially install additional incinerators to control outlet gases from the initial
incinerator. If an incineration methods with a 90% efficiency is applied initially, and one additional
incinerator with same efficiency is applied again, then the incinerators will collectively yield a 99%
(90% + 0.1*0.90%) control level. Therefore, the marginal control cost of achieving an additional
9% control is measured by the cost of an additional incinerator (Kim, 1994). Developing emission
control cost functions for each source requires the data for ROG emission from stationary
sources, types of control devices in place on the sources, their control efficiencies, and the costs
of installing and operating the equipment. Information about stationary sources and their
emissions was obtained from the California Air Resource Board’s Emission Data System (CARB,
1992a, 1992b), while the types of control measures employed by the stationary sources measures
and their costs were provided by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
District(SJVUAPCD, 1991).16
It is, however, difficult to measure accurately the cost of controlling amounts exceeding
current levels unless plants identify their choices of alternative methods with their corresponding
control costs. Because of this estimating additional control costs is likely to carry with it a wide
margin of variability.
ROG Emission Control Scenarios
In this study, four different ROG emission control policies are analyzed in the San Joaquin
Valley: 1) Command and Control (CAC) policy represented by uniform percentage reductions in
emissions, 2) Uniform Marketable Permit System(UMPS) in which all stationary sources in the
Valley freely trade their ROG emission permits by one-to-one basis, 3) Localized Marketable
Permit System(LMPS) that allows one-to-one permits trading only for stationary sources locate
within the same localized zone, 4) Ambient Permit System(APS) with a simple ROG emission
dispersion relationship based on distances between stationary sources and receptors. Control costs
associated with ROG emission reductions of 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% under the four different
control policies were applied to stationary sources to estimate cost savings by marketable permit
systems. The current control system, however, uses emission trading in a limited way and thus is
more cost-effective than CAC policy. The cost savings indicated in this study represent the
differences between the costs of the marketable permit systems and those of CAC. Thus, they
overstate the advantages of the marketable permit systems relative to the current policy. 4 aij = 1 - (dij/dsjv)
where,
dij : linear transfer coefficient from source i to receptor j.
dij : distance between source i to receptor  j in miles.
dsjv : San Joaquin Valley in length (350 miles). 
17
Emission Diffusion Relationship
The implementation of APS requires an air quality model to identify sources’ emission
diffusion relationships to each receptor’s air quality. In many air quality control regions, such as
the San Joaquin Valley, air quality models are not available because of their complexity and costs
associated with them. In this study, to provide an empirical comparison among different
marketable permit systems, a simple linear emission dispersion relationships for ROG is assumed.
Contribution of an emission source to a receptor’s air quality is determined by the distance
between the two. Because stationary sources in a county are concentrated in a major city, which is
also the major receptor of that county, I calculated the linear emission transfer coefficients (aij)
4
among the major cities to represent emission dispersion relationships among counties in the
Valley. However, the linear transfer coefficients assumed in this study is not an accurate
presentation of actual ROG emission dispersion characteristics. The simple dispersion
relationships are applied to this study to provide an empirical comparison of relative cost-
effectiveness and assurance of air quality attainment between UMPS and LMPS. The control
costs for APS in this study should not be considered as an accurate estimation of the actual least
cost of achieving a required air quality in the Valley. Table 3 details the emission transfer
coefficients among counties(cities).18
                                                               Table 3
                   The Emission Transfer Coefficients among Counties (Cities)
County Kern Fresno San Joaquin Stanislaus Merced Madera Tulare Kings
Kern 1 0.55 0.1 0.2 0.35 0.475 0.75 0.7
Fresno 0.55 1 0.5 0.625 0.775 0.9 0.825 0.85
San Joaquin 0.1 0.5 1 0.875 0.725 0.575 0.325 0.375
Stanislaus 0.2 0.625 0.875 1 0.85 0.725 0.45 0.475
Merced 0.35 0.775 0.725 0.85 1 0.85 0.575 0.6
Madera 0.475 0.9 0.575 0.725 0.85 1 0.725 0.75
Tulare 0.75 0.825 0.325 0.45 0.575 0.725 1 0.95
Kings 0.7 0.85 0.375 0.475 0.6 0.75 0.95 1
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The emission control costs increases at the increasing rate as percentage of ROG emission
reductions become greater, which reflects that controlling further emissions becomes 
 more difficult and costly. Table 4 details the emission control costs associated with the four
different emission control policies in the San Joaquin Valley. 
In the Valley, the major stationary sources emitting ROG are those involved in petroleum
processing, storage, and transfer, and the control costs for controlling ROG in this industry are
lower than other industries (Kim, 1994). The total emission control costs associated with the
CAC policy represent the highest costs of ROG emission reductions because it excludes any
possibility of trading of emission permits. Under CAC policy, the costs of controlling emissions by
county are not always directly proportional to the volume of emissions produced within that
county. For example, Kern county incurs 60% of the total ROG control costs which is relatively19
low when one considers the actual volume of its ROG emissions, which is 80% of total ROG
emissions in the San Joaquin Valley. The primary sources of Kern county’s emissions are engaged
in petroleum, processing, storage, and transfer, which enjoy lower emission control costs.
Conversely, Fresno county, which is responsible for only 5% of the total ROG emissions in the
Valley, incurs 20% of the total ROG emission control costs. Its share of the total ROG control
cost is disproprotionary high because the ROG is produced primarily by sanitary landfill and waste
management (CARB, 1992a). 
                                                             Table 4
            ROG Emission Control Costs in the San Joaquin Valley (in Million $)
ROG Emission
Control Policies
                           ROG Emission Controls in Percentage
25% 50% 75% 90%
CAC $ 6.81   $16.41 $ 32.81 $ 54.50
UMPS $ 4.18  $11.60 $ 26.10 $ 46.72
LMPS $ 4.26 $11.99 $ 26.95 $ 48.54
APS $ 4.16 $11.77 $ 26.64 $ 48.06
The shares of the total control costs for other counties are proportional to their
contribution to the total emission in the San Joaquin Valley. Table 5 details the distribution of
emission control costs for each county in the San Joaquin valley. Under CAC, the percentage
share of the total control costs for each county is constant over the range of ROG emission
reductions considered in this study.
The cost of controlling ROG emissions through the use of market incentive-based systems
are much lower than CAC. The cost savings stem from the fact that each stationary sources are20
allowed to trade their emission permits. The total control costs of meeting ROG emission
reductions to achieve a required air quality in the Valley is minimized by allowing each source to
trade their permits according to their differentiated contribution to the receptors’ air quality. The
APS with a simple emission dispersion characteristics in this study shows that a 
                                                                 Table 5
        The Distribution of ROG Emission Control Costs among Counties (in Percentage)
County 25% ROG Emission Control
CAC UMPS LMPS APS
Kern 60.83% 76.98% 73.73% 73.80%
Fresno 25.13% 12.19% 12.08% 14.08%
San Joaquin   6.79%   1.91%   7.27%  1.85%
Stanislaus   1.65%   2.82%   1.07%   3.99%
Merced   0.62%   0.37%   0.42%   0.48%
Madera   3.51%   1.53%   3.06%   1.91%
Tulare   0.58%   1.67%   0.92%   1.16%
Kings   0.90%   2.55%   1.44%   2.74%
significant cost saving from CAC policy. Unlike CAC policy, the share of the total control costs
for each county under the APS varies with the emission control level. The counties with more
permit trading possibilities reduce their share of the total control costs by trading permits. In
particular, Fresno county significantly reduces its share to the total control costs at the 25%
emission reduction level by almost 10% through buying emission permits from sources in Kern
county. However, as higher emission reductions are imposed on the stationary sources and the
possibility of trading permits is reduced, proportionally smaller cost savings are generated by21
applying APS to the San Joaquin Valley. 
UMPS minimizes the total control costs of ROG emission reduction in the San Joaquin
Valley, but it does not necessarily guarantee that all receptors meet a required air quality. Since
UMPS does not consider each sources different contribution to the same receptors, hot spots can
be created by one-to-one permit trading among them. If UMPS is applied to a wide region where
sources are widely distributed, hot spots can be easily created and their problems might be
serious. In the San Joaquin Valley, although stationary sources are clustered in a few major cities,
they still be engaged in trading of their permits across cities with long distances. Under UMPS,
hot spots are created in San Joaquin, Fresno, Stanislaus, Madera, and Merced counties. Because
San Joaquin county locates further away from other counties in the Valley and its sources have
relatively higher emission control cost, the county experiences more serious hot spot problems
than other counties as a result of buying more permits based on one-to-one trading.  Table 6
displays hot spots created with the simple ROG emission dispersion relationship assumed in this
study.
LMPS divided the San Joaquin Valley into eight local areas by county. The stationary
sources in each area are considered to contribute equally to the air quality in the Valley. The
objective of this system is to minimize the total control costs to the stationary sources on the
condition that the total ROG emissions for each local area is reduced to the level that is necessary
to attain a required air quality in that area. The stationary sources in each area are allowed to
trade freely their emission permits. The total control cost to the stationary sources to reduce ROG
is smaller than it would be without such trading of emission permits. Stationary sources are
densely clustered in Kern county, which is responsible for 80% of the ROG emissions in the22
Valley. LMPS can results in significant cost savings if stationary sources in Kern county are
allowed to freely trade their emission permits. Conversely, counties such as Madera, Merced, and
Kings will not realized significant cost savings if LMPS is instituted because they have few
stationary sources. LMPS applied to the San Joaquin Valley shows that the total control cost is
slightly higher than the least-cost strategy, APS and also prevent hot spots from being created.
                                                               Table 6
          The Resulting ROG Emission Reductions (in %) in Each County with UMPS 
County                  ROG Emission Controls in Each County (in %)
25% Reduction 50% Reduction 75% Reduction 90% Reduction
Kern 26.0% 51.6%  76.5% 90.8%
Fresno 25.1%  49.2% 73.9% 89.1%
San Joaquin 22.9% 44.5%  69.9% 87.2%
Stanislaus 24.1% 46.7%  71.6% 88.0%
Merced 24.6% 48.1% 72.9% 88.6%
Madera 25.0%  48.8% 73.5% 89.0%
Tulare 25.5% 50.7% 75.5% 90.2%
Kings 25.4% 50.3% 75.0% 89.8%
5. CONCLUSION
This study analyzed the ROG control costs of stationary sources in the San Joaquin Valley
of California. Marketable permit system are more cost-effective in meeting a required air quality
standard than CAC in the Valley. UMPS minimizes the control cost to reduce the total ROG
emission, but some counties could experience air quality worse than other counties if one-to-one23
permits trading is allowed.  LMPS would be more appropriate to ensure that no counties violate a
required air quality and yet will require lower compliance costs than CAC approaches. In fact,
LMPS can achieve a desired air quality standards as a low cost close to the least-cost strategy in
the San Joaquin Valley.
Despite our best efforts, the ROG emission control costs estimated in this study are
subjected to many uncertainties and measurement errors. First, the cost functions of emission
controls from stationary sources used in this study have some weaknesses. It is assumed that
stationary sources apply the same control measures to reduce emission further. Alternatively,
sources could use cleaner fuels, change production processes, or install new control equipment
with higher control efficiencies, rather than installing the same device in sequence. This study does
not allow for these possible choices; thus we probably overestimate control costs for ROG
emission reductions. Second, the simple ROG emission dispersion relationship employed in this
study does not represent the actual emission diffusion characteristics in the San Joaquin Valley.
The control costs for APS is not an accurate estimation of the least cost of achieving a required
air quality in the San Joaquin Valley.  Finally, this study focus only on ROG emitting stationary
sources. If mobile sources were to included and allowed to trade emission permits across
stationary and mobile sources, this would results in further cost savings of emission control. This
study is likely to overestimate the true control costs because most factors provide upward bias to
control cost; however, the magnitude of overestimation cannot be measured accurately.24
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